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Abstract 
 
Evolutionary psychology has faced ‘implacable hostility’ (Dawkins, 2005) 
from a number of intellectual fronts. Critics of evolutionary psychology have tried 
to paint this perspective variously as reductionist and overly deterministic, at best, 
and as sexist, racist, and downright evil at worst. The current paper argues that all 
psychological frameworks which assume that human beings are the result of the 
organic evolutionary forces of natural and sexual selection are, essentially, 
evolutionary in nature (regardless of whether they traditionally fall under the label 
of evolutionary psychology). In other words, the perspective presented here argues 
that all psychology is evolutionary psychology. Two specific mis-characterizations 
of evolutionary psychology ((a) that it is eugenicist in nature and (b) that it is a 
fully non-situationist, immutable perspective on behavior) are addressed here with 
an eye toward elaborating on how these distorted conceptions of evolutionary 
psychology are non-constructive and non-progressive. A final section focuses on 
how the social sciences in general could benefit from being evolutionized. 
 
“Evolutionary psychology (is) … subject to a level of implacable hostility 
which seems far out of proportion to anything even sober reason or common 
politeness might sanction” (Dawkins, 2005, p. 975). 
If you are a modern scholar of human behavior who uses evolutionary theory 
to help guide your research and, accordingly, label yourself an evolutionary 
psychologist (as I do), you may find Dawkins’ aforementioned quote as capturing 
the essence of how evolutionary psychology (EP) is perceived in many modern 
academic circles. In fact, based on my experiences, this quote captures the current 
state of affairs regarding EP in the broader landscape of academia in general so 
well that it is actually a bit unsettling. 
Worded another way, this implacable hostility seems to result from scholars 
across disparate disciplines who conceptualize EP as downright evil. EP is often 
framed as evil by all sorts of people for all sorts of reasons. In terms of purely 
academic critiques, EP is often framed as overly deterministic and reductionistic PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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(see Pinker, 2002) while social critics of EP with more applied concerns paint EP 
as a sexist, racist, and even eugenicist doctrine designed with a hidden political 
agenda that should serve the status quo by, presumably, justifying such amoral acts 
as sexual harassment, murder, and war (see Hagen, 2005). 
An unfortunate outcome regarding the current state of affairs pertains to the 
fact that EP is attacked from people holding political perspectives that span the 
spectrum of ideologies. Fundamentalist Christians, who necessarily reject ideas that 
are premised on evolution as an accepted theory of speciation, reject EP simply due 
to its reliance on evolutionary theory. This ideological hurdle is by no means small: 
A recent survey found that 87% of United States citizens do not believe that 
evolutionary forces in general (and natural selection, in particular), unaided by a 
supernatural deity, are responsible for human origins (CBS News Poll, November 
2004). Such individuals, whose numbers are, simply, daunting, are likely to reject 
EP as a sustainable perspective on any aspect of human functioning. 
However, in addition to the resistance to EP presented by fundamentalist 
religious individuals, there is, in effect, a new kind of creationist (Ehrenreich & 
McIntosh, 1997), so to speak, rooted in secular intellectualism. These so-called new 
creationists are, in fact, very different from fundamentalist Christians in their 
ideological foundation. The new creationists may be conceptualized as academics 
and scholars who study varied aspects of human affairs from the perspective of the 
Standard Social Science Model (SSSM; Pinker, 2002), a model for understanding 
human behavior which is largely premised on the notion of the blank slate. The 
SSSM essentially conceives of human psychology as qualitatively different from 
the psychology of all other species. The SSSM presumes that there is no basic 
human nature – that the mind (and its corresponding physiological substrates) are 
fully malleable based on environmental stimuli and that all behavioral and 
psychological aspects of people are the result of experiences with environmental 
stimuli across ontogenetic time. 
This denial of human nature (see Pinker, 2002), which is prevalent in many of 
the social sciences, has come to serve as the only politically acceptable paradigm in 
much of academia. Champions of this perspective are often more critical of EP than 
are adherents of fundamentalist Christianity. From the perspective of the SSSM, EP 
is problematic largely because its basic premises focus on understanding the nature 
of human nature. 
For instance, consider David Buss’ work which revolves around understanding 
sex-differentiated mating strategies in humans (see Buss, 2003) from an 
evolutionary perspective. Research by Buss and his colleagues has documented 
many basic sex differences in the psychology of human mating. Several different 
studies, using varied methods, have replicated Buss’ basic finding that men desire 
more lifetime sexual partners than do women (see Schmitt, 2005). Buss’ evolution-
based explanation of these findings is rooted in Trivers’ (1972) parental investment 
theory which suggests that males and females should differ in their mating tactics 
as a result of fundamentally different costs faced by each sex associated with PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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bearing and raising children across the evolution of our species. From this 
perspective, women in our ancestral past who were driven to pursue short-term 
sexual strategies would have, on average, had less reproductive success compared 
with males pursuing similarly promiscuous strategies. A result of this sex-specific 
differential reproduction associated with variability in promiscuity over deep time 
would have led to sex-specific mating strategies (favoring promiscuity in males 
over females). 
Critics of EP who may be thought to represent new creationism (e.g., Buller, 
2005) have tried hard to argue that findings which demonstrate such sex differences 
in mating strategies are based on flawed research. Further, such critics argue that 
even if such phenomena as sex differences in number of sex partners desired have 
been documented via sound research, these findings are best understood as 
resulting completely from environmental conditions during ontogenetic time. In 
other words, the SSSM perspective argues that all differences between the sexes in 
number of sexual partners desired results from males and females learning different 
messages about sexuality across their lifetimes. In short, this perspective argues that 
this phenomenon does not reflect basic and natural differences between male and 
female mating psychology – it only reflects differences in socialization between the 
sexes (differences that exist, in varying degrees, across human cultures). 
Adherents of the SSSM perspective argue that appealing to evolutionarily 
shaped differences between the psychologies of men and women to explain 
something such as universal sex differences in desire for multiple sex partners is an 
inherently sexist approach. In short, these new creationists believe that any appeals 
to an evolutionarily shaped human nature to explain psychological phenomena 
(regardless of how well the said phenomena are documented) imply that human 
behavior is highly constrained by our nature, is genetically determined, and is, in 
effect, immutable. As such, adherents of the SSSM feel something of an obligation 
to fight EP, as they believe they are fighting an intellectual doctrine which sees 
human behavior as largely immutable and which ultimately provides a scholarly 
rationale for the status quo (which inherently treats people unfairly). 
From the SSSM perspective, EP paints a picture of humans as fully under the 
control of genes. Further, the SSSM perspective sees EP as a doctrine that endorses 
all aspects of the status quo related to sexism. As seen through the lens of the 
SSSM, all phenomena documented by evolutionary psychologists and, 
subsequently, framed as resulting from evolutionary forces, are implicitly endorsed 
by evolutionary psychologists. As such, phenomena such as male promiscuity 
(Schmitt, 2005), filicide (Daly & Wilson, 1988), rape (Malamuth, Huppin & Paul, 
2005), murder (Buss, 2005a), and war (Tooby & Cosmides, 1988) are seen, from 
the SSSM perspective, as phenomena that are, essentially, supported, condoned, 
and, perhaps, encouraged by evolutionary psychologists as they are phenomena that 
evolutionary psychologists have studied from an evolutionary perspective and have 
tried to explain in terms of the nature of human nature. PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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Let me go on the record saying that I am very uncomfortable (on both moral 
and intellectual grounds) with any perspective that sees humans as fully incapable 
of choosing their own behaviors. Further, I am ardently opposed to sexism – 
ardently opposed to the idea that men and women (and boys and girls) should be 
treated differently by rules created by a society and should be given different 
opportunities within a society. I am, further, from a personal standpoint, not 
someone who encourages males to engage in promiscuous behavior and not 
someone who supports men who fly into violent jealous rages with females as 
targets of their anger and aggression. Additionally, I am strongly opposed to war, 
murder, rape, and filicide. I would feel a moral obligation to reject outright any 
doctrine which is inconsistent with these fundamental aspects of my belief system. 
In sum, I would see such a doctrine as downright evil. 
So herein lies the problem, a problem which, as I see it, is largely one of 
perspective. If EP were the kind of intellectual doctrine that I describe in the prior 
paragraph, then it would be a morally disturbing framework. However, as several 
scholars have argued before me (e.g., Pinker, 2002), EP is simply not such a 
doctrine. In the remainder of this paper, I argue that EP is the following: 
A. A basic intellectual framework for understanding all psychological 
phenomena 
B.  A set of principles which, at its core, simply asserts that the human nervous 
system and resultant behavior are ultimately products of organic 
evolutionary processes 
C.  One of the most situationist/contextualist perspectives that exists within 
psychology writ large 
D.  Altogether different from the notion of eugenics 
E.  A perspective that has the potential to serve as an underlying meta-theory 
to guide all the behavioral sciences in the future. 
 
 
Evolutionary Psychology is Not Evil 
 
In engaging in the thought exercise of trying to empathize with academics who 
characterize EP as downright evil, I have concluded that the problem seems to lie 
largely in the naturalistic fallacy (see Buss, 2004). Often, when people hear that 
some phenomenon is being framed as part of our nature, shaped by evolutionary 
forces across thousands of generations, they infer that the scientists who are 
documenting said evolutionarily shaped quality see this quality as something about 
us that should be the case. In other words, for instance, if one hears Daly, Wilson, 
and Weghorst (1982) argue that male sexual jealousy, and violence that has been 
directed toward countless women as a result of such jealousy, may be part of our 
evolutionary heritage, one may infer that these authors are arguing that men should 
show marked, intense, and emotional jealousy when faced with cheating partners PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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and, further, that they should use violence against women as a solution to such 
problems. 
Of course, Daly et al. (1982) believe nothing of the kind. Documenting that 
something is part of our nature is not synonymous with arguing that it should be 
condoned by society. Similarly, when David Buss (2005a) argues that natural 
selection has shaped patterns of homicide and murder in a non-random way, such 
that our ancestors were most likely to murder when murder was likely to have 
increased the possibility of passing on genes of the murderer (i.e., under conditions 
in which murder had fitness benefits), he is not arguing that murder is good and/or 
that society should support murder. He is, rather, using evolutionary theory, the 
most powerful intellectual framework that exists in the life sciences, to help 
understand behaviors that are of high relevance to the functioning of society. 
In sum, the naturalistic fallacy corresponds to conflating phenomena that 
naturally are with phenomena that should be. As evolutionary psychologists are 
charged with the task of understanding the nature of human psychological 
processes, they are at particular risk of having their work mis-characterized by 
others who are employing the reasoning that typifies the naturalistic fallacy. 
Further, for someone who is conflating some findings and ideas from EP with 
statements by evolutionary psychologists regarding how things should be, EP is 
likely to come across as appearing morally deficient and, yes, perhaps even evil! 
 
 
What Evolutionary Psychology Is? 
 
While there are different brands of EP, with some variability in basic assertions 
(see Buller, 2005), EP is, in its most basic form, simply an understanding of 
behavior that is guided by evolutionary theory. In the words of Richard Dawkins 
(2005): “The central claim … (that evolutionary psychologists) … are making is 
not an extraordinary one. It amounts to the exceedingly modest assertion that minds 
are on the same footing as bodies where Darwinian natural selection is concerned” 
(p. 978). 
As such, EP is an explanatory framework that has implications for 
understanding all psychological phenomena. It essentially conceptualizes humans 
as products of natural selection - thereby not conceiving of our species as somehow 
immune from the laws that govern the natural world. It is a humbling perspective in 
some respects. 
In any case, this perspective is monistic at its core; it conceives of human 
behavior as resulting from the nervous system - including the brain - which was, 
according to this perspective (and to most modern scientists who study 
psychological phenomena), shaped by evolutionary processes such as natural 
selection. PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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If the nervous system were shaped by natural selection, then individual humans 
with certain neuronal qualities in our ancestral past (e.g., those with features of the 
autonomic nervous system) were more likely to survive and reproduce compared 
with conspecifics (other humans) with nervous systems that were less likely to 
ultimately lead to reproduction. 
Ancestral humans with features of the autonomic nervous system were more 
likely to respond optimally to immediate threatening stimuli in requisite situations 
(e.g., running from a predator). Thus, they were more likely to survive than others 
with less advanced autonomic nervous systems. A simple logical truth is that being 
more likely to survive necessarily increases the likelihood of reproduction (corpses 
are not very good at successfully mating). As such, this (partly) genetically shaped 
feature of human anatomy (with integral implications for human behavior), the 
autonomic nervous system, was 'naturally selected' and has thereby come to typify 
our species. 
This same reasoning applies to all domains of psychology. Human behavioral 
patterns are part of the natural world - and human beings are living organisms that 
have come about by evolutionary processes. As such, attempts at understanding 
such basic aspects of the human experience - mind and behavior - without 
understanding the broad evolutionary factors that have given rise to our species 
and, ultimately, to our psychology, is, from the perspective of EP, simply 
misguided. We can do better in understanding human psychology by understanding 
the nuances of evolutionary principles. 
From my perspective, these are the basic ideas of EP.  Note that I provide a list 
of resources (mostly developed by others; see Table 1) to introduce the reader to 
this field from various angles that fall under the general umbrella of EP. In sum, EP 
is simply a framework for understanding human behavior that has the capacity to 
unite all areas of psychology more so than any other paradigm that has existed in 
the history of psychology as a discipline. It is not driven by ideology; it is driven by 
the basic scientific motive of increasing understanding of the natural world. PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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Table 1. Web-Based Resources that Provide Basic Information about Evolutionary 
Psychology 
1 
Glenn Geher’s Evolutionary Psychology Course Website: 
http://www.newpaltz.edu/~geherg/classes/archive/evolve/evolve.htm 
2 
Information on the Evolutionary Studies Program at the State University of New York 
at New Paltz  
http://www.newpaltz.edu/~geherg/evos 
3 
Information on the Evolutionary Studies Program at Binghamton University 
http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~evos/  
directed by David Sloan Wilson (http://biology.binghamton.edu/dwilson/) 
4 
Ed Hagen’s Chapter on Controversies Surrounding Evolutionary Psychology 
(published in David Buss’ (ed., 2005) Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology) 
http://itb.biologie.hu-berlin.de/%7Ehagen/papers/Controversies.pdf 
5 
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby’s Introduction to the Field of Evolutionary 
Psychology 
http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html 
6 
Ed Hagen’s “Frequently Asked Questions about Evolutionary Psychology (e.g., "Is 
Evolutionary Psychology Sexist?")” 
http://www.anth.ucsb.edu/projects/human/evpsychfaq.html 
7 
Russil Durant and Bruce Ellis’s Introduction to Evolutionary Psychology:  
http://media.wiley.com/product_data/excerpt/38/04713840/0471384038.pdf 
8 
Human Behavior and Evolution Society page introducing the field:  
http://www.hbes.com/intro_to_field.htm 
9 
Personal Accounts about Applying for Academic Jobs While Branded as an 
Evolutionary Psychologist (by Fisher, Kruger, Platek, & Salmon, 2005) 
http://human-nature.com/ep/articles/ep02160173.html 
 
 
Evolutionary Psychology Mischaracterized as an Immutable, Hyper-
Dispositionist, Non-Situationist Perspective 
 
One of the beliefs that many people tend to hold about EP is that it is a non-
situationist doctrine, suggesting that organisms have just a few immutable, 
invariant ways of responding which are under the direct control of genes. This 
portrait of EP is simply inaccurate (see Kurzban & Haselton, 2005). EP posits that 
species-typical psychological design features with some heritable component have 
been shaped by natural and sexual selection. Often, many (but not all) evolutionary 
psychologists will conceive of such design features as adaptations. In any case, 
such adaptations are rarely understood by evolutionary psychologists as being 
context-independent. 
Evolutionary psychologists and biologists make an important distinction 
between non-conditional and conditional strategies that describe the phenotypes of PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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different organisms. A classic example of a non-conditional, fully genetically 
determined (and immutable) strategy is found in male sunfish (Gross, 1982), which 
come in two varieties. The first variety includes large males who have the ability to 
acquire sufficient territories in intra-sexual competition. The second variety 
includes smaller, sneaker males, who are nearly indiscernible from females and 
who do not elicit aggressive responses from territory-holding males. While 
territory-holding males reproduce by honestly attracting females, sneaker males use 
a somewhat dishonest strategy: they blast their gametes after a female has released 
her eggs in a large male’s territory, thereby using deception as a tool for 
reproduction. It turns out that the differences between these kinds of males is 
attributable to genetic differences. As such, the strategies employed are non-
conditional. 
The notion of conditional strategies, on the other hand, corresponds to 
situations in which an organism modifies its strategy vis a vis variability in 
situational factors. For instance, male tree frogs (Perrill, Gerhardt & Daniel, 1978) 
use strategies similar to the male sunfish when it comes to mating. Sometimes, a 
male will carve out a territory and croak loudly. At other times, a male will hide 
near a territory-holding male and try to mate with females that are attracted to the 
croaking, territory-holding male. Importantly, in this species, males have been 
documented to show strategic pluralism (Simpson & Gangestad, 2000); they 
modify their choice of strategy depending on the nature of such situational factors 
as the number of male territory-holders at a given time. 
The use of a variety of strategies by male wood frogs does not suggest that 
their repertoire of mating behaviors is somehow outside the bounds of natural law 
or that these strategies are not designed with for ‘purpose’ of reproduction. Clearly, 
these mating strategies are related to optimal reproduction, a fact that speaks to 
their selection by evolutionary processes. As such, evolutionary geneticists (e.g., 
Maynard Smith, 2002) and evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Simpson & Gangestad, 
2000) have come to apply evolutionary reasoning to our understanding of mixed 
behavioral strategies that are highly context-sensitive. 
In fact, modern-day EP is an extraordinarily situationist perspective. Consider, 
for instance, evolutionarily informed research on homicide and familial violence. 
All of the most highly cited work in this area focuses on situational factors that 
underlie family violence. For instance, Daly and Wilson’s (1988) often-cited work 
on violence toward children is all about contextual factors that covary with this 
atrocious act. Simply, the presence of a step-parent in a household has been shown 
to be the primary contextual factor that predicts fatal violence toward children. 
Another contextual factor that Daly and Wilson document as having a significant 
relationship with such violence has to do with the age of a given child (another 
contextual factor). In fact, their research, which is, in this regard, very prototypical 
of much work in EP overall, is all about contextual factors that underlie behaviors. 
Consider, as another example, research on factors that predict promiscuous 
behavior on the part of women. Evolutionary psychologists have uncovered such PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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important contextual factors as localized sex ratios, ovulation cycles, a woman’s 
age, and the presence of children from prior mateships (see Buss, 2003) – each such 
contextual factor serving as an important statistical predictor of female promiscuity. 
In short, EP is, in fact, a highly situationist perspective, generally conceiving of 
human behavioral strategies as being extremely flexible and as falling within the 
realm of this general idea of strategic pluralism. 
EP does not conceptualize humans as genetically guided automatons whose 
conscious decision-making processes are irrelevant or non-existent. Rather, this 
perspective sees humans as capable of extraordinary conscious decision-making. 
Further, with its roots in strategic pluralism, EP is situationist at its core. 
Importantly, EP has lessons to provide regarding the nature of situationism as an 
epistemological doctrine. While situationism in the social sciences is often framed 
as conceiving of human behavior as highly under the influence of situational 
influences (both small and large; see Ross & Nisbett, 1991), this generic brand of 
situationism has generally been framed in a manner that is devoid of any insights 
into how important psychological design features have been ultimately shaped by 
evolutionary forces for the purpose of reproduction. 
The kind of situationism that characterizes modern-day EP may be thought of 
as a sort of evolutionary situationism. This particular brand of situationism suggests 
that while human behavior is largely under the control of situational influences, the 
particular situational factors that should matter most in affecting behavior are ones 
that bear directly on factors associated with survival and reproductive success. As 
such, Daly and Wilson (1988) did not document just any factors that underlie 
familial violence – they specifically uncovered the role of step-parenting, a 
situational factor with clear and theoretically predictable relevance to issues tied to 
genetic fitness (from a strictly genetic-fitness perspective, a step-child shares no 
genes with a step-parent, and is, thus, costly). 
Given the tremendous potential for EP to inform the search for contextual 
factors that underlie human psychological outcomes, this idea of evolutionary 
situationism has the potential to create extraordinary bridges between traditional 
social psychology and EP. 
 
 
Evolutionary Psychology Mischaracterized as a Eugenicist Doctrine 
 
An atypical, ardently negative criticism of EP that I have recently become 
aware of (from several of my students) suggests that EP is, in fact, a form of 
eugenics. As I argue in this section, EP is absolutely not synonymous with 
eugenics. Period. Eugenics is all about how human societies should selectively 
breed people so that only relatively fit individuals are the ones to reproduce. The 
goal of eugenicist is to create an optimal species. What a disturbing idea this 
eugenics is!  Further, how far from EP it is! Consider, for instance, male sexual 
jealousy (Daly et al., 1982) - the tendency, documented across cultures, for males PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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to be particularly upset by thoughts of their female romantic partners engaging in 
sexual infidelity coupled with a proclivity toward committing relatively aggressive 
acts tied to sexual infidelity in violent ways (relative to females). EP is interested in 
how this phenomenon may be species-typical and how it may have been shaped by 
natural selection. Further, evolutionary psychologists are interested in 
understanding the detrimental impact of this phenomenon on society and are 
interested, further, in using knowledge gleaned from evolutionarily guided research 
to help solve social problems associated with this phenomenon. 
On the other hand, someone adopting a eugenics perspective would be focusing 
on improving the species in terms of optimizing the gene pool - thus, a eugenicist 
would see such jealousy as bad insofar as it may work to preclude the most fit 
among us from having more mates than others! 
An evolutionary psychologist is focusing on human behavior as shaped to 
optimize individuals' own chances of reproduction. EP is (generally) a decidedly 
non-group-selectionist approach to understanding behavior. It very much focuses 
on behavior as largely serving the purpose of getting one's own genes into the 
future - with essentially no regard for 'saving the species.' A eugenicist, on the other 
hand, believes that we should use our understanding of the effects of genes on 
behavior and bodies to consciously choose who should reproduce and who should 
not for the good of the species. This perspective suggests that we should optimize 
the gene pool of the species via selective breeding - that is the goal of eugenics. 
That is not at all the goal of evolutionary psychology. 
From the perspective of eugenics, we should all work to have people like 
Arnold Schwarzenegger and Britney Spears do all the mating for our species. From 
the perspective of Evolutionary Psychology, people were shaped by natural 
selection to endorse nothing of the kind - rather, from this perspective, we were 
shaped to work to reproduce our own particular genes, regardless, in fact, of 
whether we believe ours may actually be the best in the pool!  As is delineated in 
Table 2, EP and eugenics differ in: 
(a) the level of selection (for EP, selection happens at the level of the 
individual whereas eugenics is generally a group-selectionist idea) 
(b) the selector (for EP, the selector of heritable qualities is blind natural 
selection; for eugenics, the selector is a group of humans with conscious 
intent) and 
(c)  their basic goals (the goal of an evolutionary psychologist is to use insights 
gleaned from evolutionary theory to understand human behavior; the basic 
goal of eugenics is to improve the human gene pool for the purposes of 
some small, powerful group). PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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Table 2. Distinguishing Evolutionary Psychology from Eugenics 
  Evolutionary Psychology  Eugenics 
Level of Selection 
Natural selection happens at the 
level of the individual organism. 
Psychological qualities viewed as 
'adaptations' are qualities that 
confer survival and/or 
reproductive benefits to the 
organisms possessing the 
particular qualities. 
The entity that is presumably 
'benefiting' here is the individual. 
In large part, eugenics is a 
group-selectionist doctrine. It 
suggests that people should 
work together in selectively 
breeding humans to make it so 
that the species will benefit in 
the future. 
The entity that is presumably 
'benefiting' here is the species. 
The Selector 
The process of natural selection 
(and, perhaps, other evolutionary 
processes such as sexual 
selection). Natural selection is a 
blind process with no intention 
and no plan. 
The selector here is a natural 
process fully devoid of human 
intentions and political agendas. 
Individuals or groups of 
individuals with particular 
intentional plans/objectives 
and, often, particular political 
agendas. 
The selector here is a fully 
human entity, replete with 
intentions and political 
agendas. 
Basic Goal 
Evolutionary Psychology 
represents a basic scientific 
endeavor. The goal is to use our 
understanding of evolutionary 
principles so as to optimize our 
ability to understand human 
behavior and psychological 
processes. 
This basic scientific paradigm 
does not have a specific political 
agenda; increasing understanding 
of human psychology is the 
agenda. 
The goal of eugenics is quite 
applied in nature. The point of 
this perspective is to apply our 
understanding of genes to a 
program of selective breeding 
of humans.  
This applied perspective has a 
very specific agenda. PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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Table 2. Continued 
  Evolutionary Psychology  Eugenics 
Consciousness 
Many psychological processes 
that are studied by Evolutionary 
Psychologists are unconscious in 
nature. For instance, Cosmides 
and Tooby (1992) argue that we 
differentially apply rules of logic, 
unknowingly, when we are faced 
with highly evolutionarily 
relevant versus relatively 
evolutionarily non-relevant 
judgments. Such unconscious 
processes were shaped by natural 
selection to serve the purposes of 
individual reproduction. 
The basic idea of eugenics is 
a highly conscious one. 
There is not a focus on 
unconscious psychological 
processes. Rather, from this 
perspective, there is a clear 
and highly conscious plan. 
The plan is for members of 
society to selectively breed in 
a way that would lead to an 
optimized gene pool for the 
society at large in the future. 
Thoughts on Arnold 
Schwarzenegger 
From the perspective of 
Evolutionary Psychology, this 
man has been endowed with 
highly adaptive genes. Good for 
him. Evolutionary psychologists 
do not want (consciously or not) 
him to out-reproduce them. 
Heterosexual male evolutionary 
psychologists involved in 
monogamous relationships would 
not prefer that their female 
partners would mate with Arnold 
rather than with themselves. 
A eugenicist might see 
Arnold as a horse breeder 
would see a blue-ribbon 
stallion: He should be used as 
a stud and should be 
encouraged, from this 
perspective, to mate with as 
many (relatively fit) females 
as possible in hopes of 
improving the species. 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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In addition to Table 2, which delineates the important distinctions between EP 
and eugenics, I have provided an example of a multiple-choice test question which 
addresses this distinction further (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. A Multiple-Choice Examination Item Demonstrating the Basic Distinction 
between Evolutionary Psychology and Eugenics 
From the perspective of Evolutionary Psychology, psychological characteristics _______ 
with the primary function of increasing the likelihood that the _______. 
A. are selected by natural selection; species in which the adaptation exists will not go 
extinct 
B. should be selectively bred by people; broad group of organisms to which individuals 
belong (e.g., animals versus plants) will likely out-compete other broad groups of 
organisms 
C. are selected by natural selection; specific individuals displaying such characteristics in 
ancestral contexts were particularly likely to out-compete conspecifics (i.e., other 
humans) and thereby reproduce in relatively higher frequencies 
D. should be selectively bred by people; fittest members of the species are most likely to 
survive and reproduce. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The correct answer here is C. Evolutionary Psychologists focus on qualities that are 
'adaptive' from the perspective of individuals.  However, if the question started with the 
phrase, "From the perspective of eugenics ...," the answer would be D.  
 
In thinking about eugenics, a reader might be thinking about who modern-day 
eugenicists are. While I am clearly arguing that anyone looking to EP for hints of 
eugenics is barking up the wrong tree (so to speak), there are clearly eugenicist 
implications found in many modern social movements. Given the historical 
atrocities associated with eugenics and the potential mis-use of modern 
technologies, I think it is very much worth our time to consider current 
technological, social, and intellectual trends that may ultimately provide a basis for 
future eugenicist endeavors. 
One strikingly large such social movement concerns observations in sperm-
donation trends. In sperm donation, women are able to choose qualities of their 
offspring based on phenotypal features of genetic fathers who have donated sperm. 
Consider a recent article published in the New York Times (Egan, 2006) dealing 
with the prevalence of women choosing to have children via sperm donation with 
no paternal care to assist in the parenting process. According to this article, “The 
California Cryobank, the largest sperm bank in the country, owed a third of its PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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business to single women in 2005, shipping them 9,600 vials of sperm, each good 
for one insemination.” 
In addition to the relatively large economic niche that sperm donation is filling 
in industrialized societies, this New York Times article addresses the nature of the 
donors who are selected as fathers. The results presented in this article are eye-
opening. For instance, Egan writes that, “Short donors don't exist; because most 
women seek out tall ones, most banks don't accept men under 5-foot-9.” Further, 
the article goes on to describe a woman who chose sperm from a tall German rugby 
player (who the mother in question describes as ‘Aryan’). One could argue that the 
mothers who are choosing sperm in this way are engaging in eugenicist practices. 
In fact, the parallels between sperm choice and eugenics are made quite explicitly 
by this allusion to the ‘Aryan’ sperm donor. 
This line of thought, interestingly, extends to all non-random mate-choice 
processes in any sexually reproducing species (see Miller, 2000). Once individuals 
within a species are using criteria to selectively choose to mate with individuals 
based on the presence of certain phenotypal qualities, parallels regarding eugenics 
may become apparent. In writing on this topic, Miller writes that “Finding mates 
with good genes is one of the major functions of mate choice (across all sexually 
reproducing species)” (p. 431). He further writes that “We could outlaw genetic 
screening for heritable traits, but I imagine that our jails would have difficulty 
housing all of the sexually reproducing animals in the world that exercise mate 
choice – the female humpback whales alone would require prohibitively costly, 
high-security aquariums”. 
My point in describing the parallels between the sperm-donation industry, 
mate-choice in general, and eugenics is not to sound alarm bells (although this 
analysis does raise concerns that should be addressed!). Rather, my point here is 
that there are existing practices in all societies which potentially do have some 
eugenicist overtones. Further, importantly, work within the domain of EP that is 
conducted by scholars who are interested in helping us understand human nature, 
simply, has no conceptual and/or empirical overlap with eugenics whatsoever. 
 
 
The Future of Evolutionary Psychology 
 
Evolutionary psychology has proven extremely powerful in (a) providing 
coherent explanations for many basic human behavioral patterns, (b) generating 
new research questions that simply would not be on the radar screen without EP as 
a guiding framework, and (c) generating novel findings about what it means to be 
human. 
In terms of providing coherent explanations for basic psychological processes, 
consider Ekman and Friesen’s (1986) landmark work demonstrating the universal 
nature of emotional expression. The evolutionary reasoning that these authors draw 
upon, arguing, essentially, that emotional-expression abilities must have been PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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positively selected for across the evolution of our species due to the fitness-related 
benefits of such abilities, provides an extremely useful and coherent framework for 
understanding human emotion in general. I am fully confident that it is very much 
in the interest of all the behavioral sciences to ultimately support efforts designed to 
understand human behavioral patterns in light of our evolutionary history. 
In generating novel research questions, consider Haselton and Miller’s (2006) 
research demonstrating that women are particularly attracted to indices of creativity 
in potential mates during peaks in their ovulatory cycles. This research is 
excessively rooted in evolutionary ideas. First, the general idea that female mating 
psychology should vary as a function of variability in fertility across the ovulatory 
cycle is an idea that only makes sense when we think of psychological processes as 
being designed for the purposes of successfully reproducing. Additionally, the fact 
that this research focuses on attraction to indices of creative intelligence is rooted in 
Miller’s (2000) theory of higher-order human cognitive abilities (such as creative 
intelligence) as having resulted from sexual selection pressures across evolutionary 
time and as serving the function of affording individuals benefits in the domain of 
intrasexual competition. Again, without guidance from EP, which suggests that 
basic psychological processes likely serve a reproductive function, the questions 
addressed in this research simply never would have made it onto the radar screen. 
Just as EP allows novel questions to be asked, it allows such questions to be 
answered, thereby providing the world with all kinds of discoveries regarding our 
nature. While research in the domain of adaptations to ovulation strongly 
demonstrates several novel findings regarding human mating behavior (see 
Gangestad, Thornhill & Garver-Apgar, 2005), such research only provides the tip 
of the iceberg when it comes to novel findings obtained by evolutionary 
psychologists. In fact, evolutionary psychologists are responsible for uncovering 
novel findings across the entire range of psychological phenomena such as the 
inter-play between mating and homicide (Buss, 2005a), the neuropsychological 
substrates underlying the detection of individuals who cheat in social-exchange 
situations (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005) the phenomenology of stranger anxiety 
experienced by babies (Heerwagen & Orians, 2002), and the nature of altruistic 
tendencies across species (e.g.,  Burnstein, 2005; Sherman, 1985). 
(For a reader interested in reading more about the scientific utility of EP across 
the modern landscape of the behavioral sciences, I strongly recommend Ketelaar 
and Ellis’ (2000) paper which conceives of EP as a meta-theory that guides 
research in a coherent manner and a paper by Schmitt and Pilcher (2004) which 
provides a model regarding the thorough methodology employed by evolutionary 
psychologists when they are at their best in trying to uncover human nature.) 
In light of the powerful nature of EP in generating new questions and findings, 
I believe, strongly, that psychology writ large can only reach its potential by 
incorporating an evolutionary perspective across all its areas. Further, I believe that 
there is reason for optimism regarding the future of EP and the future of an 
evolutionarily informed psychology in general. Consider, for example, a recent PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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analysis of articles published in a leading journal in the behavioral sciences, 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, which revealed that more than 30% of articles 
published in the last decade include evolution in the title or as a keyword (Wilson, 
Garruto, McLeod, Regan & Tan-Wilson, unpublished manuscript). These findings 
suggest that evolution is, in fact, making its way into the behavioral sciences. 
However, with that said, an analysis regarding the education of the authors of 
these evolutionarily informed articles tells a different story. When authors of these 
articles were interviewed about their education, they generally reported being self-
taught with regard to evolutionary principles. Such an effect is consistent with the 
portrait of academic institutions as less than fully embracing of the incorporation of 
evolution into the realm of human behavior. 
Taken together, the different ideas presented in this section paint a variegated 
picture with regard to the inclusion of evolution into the behavioral sciences. On 
the one hand, a great deal of research on the evolutionary origins of human 
behavior and psychological processes is being conducted. This research is leading 
to novel findings regarding topics that cut across all areas within psychology (see 
Buss, 2005b). On the other hand, EP is a target of hostility from adherents of 
multiple political and ideological perspectives. Such implacable hostility emanates 
from characterizations of EP as overly deterministic, reductionistic, sexist, racist, 
and, simply, evil. 
Importantly, there are several critiques of EP that are reasonable and that 
should be addressed. For instance, Panksepp and Panksepp (2000), argue that 
evolutionary psychologists could improve their work by taking a less modularistic 
approach, working more closely on neurological substrates of behavior, and paying 
more attention to research regarding the neuroplasticity which seems to 
characterize much of the human brain. To be fair to these critics (and to others), I 
strongly believe that EP is not perfect and this approach to psychology has room for 
improvement. However, I see no reason to throw the baby out with the bath water. 
As Dawkins (2005) writes regarding recent critiques of EP: “Some individual 
evolutionary psychologists need to clean up their methodological act. Maybe many 
do. But that is true of scientists in all fields” (p. 978). 
In short, EP has proven itself as having extraordinary abilities to (a) yield novel 
ways of thinking about who we are and to (b) generate new findings that shed light 
on the depths of our minds. While this approach may not be perfect, and while 
certain studies conducted under the general banner of EP may need improvement, 
the overall approach to understanding human behavior – focusing on understanding 
how basic psychological processes ultimately bear on issues tied to reproductive 
success – has an enormous capacity to improve our understanding of ourselves. I 
urge psychological researchers and students to go down the path of evolutionary 
enlightenment so as to allow psychology to realize its full potential – ultimately 
allowing our discipline to best help people deal with the many problems associated 
with what it means to be human. PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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CONCLUSION 
 
My intellectual passions permeate my teaching and my research. After learning 
about applications of evolutionary theory to issues regarding behavior in Benjamin 
Sachs’ Animal Behavior course in 1990 at the University of Connecticut, I came to 
see the evolutionarily informed approach to psychology as the most coherent and 
powerful framework for understanding behavior across species (including Homo 
Sapiens). This intellectual approach to understanding psychology has permeated 
my teaching and my research since that time. 
As stated prior, I do not believe that all EP is perfect. In the future, evolutionary 
approaches to psychology will surely benefit from better understanding the inter-
relationship between cultural and genetic forces that underlie behavior, studying the 
nature of neuroplasticity from an evolutionary perspective, teasing apart 
psychological qualities that were shaped for survival versus reproductive purposes, 
and addressing the interplay between behaviors that emerge in an ontogenetic 
timescale versus behaviors that are the result of thousands of generations of 
selection across our phylogenetic history. Further, I am certain that other 
improvements to an evolutionary approach to psychology are out there! 
However – my student Warren Greig tells me that I need to be less apologetic 
when it comes to my passion for EP. And, as usual, he is right. As such, I end by 
making some simple points. First, EP is not an inherently evil approach to 
understanding human behavior. It is not overly immutable in its portrait of humans. 
It is, alternatively, one of the most situationistic/contextualistic doctrines that exists 
regarding human behavior. EP is not the new eugenics. In fact, EP and eugenics 
have virtually no commonalities whatsoever (see Table 2). 
Evolutionary psychology is an extraordinarily coherent framework for 
understanding virtually all of human psychology. Its basic assumptions, suggesting 
(a) that fundamental human psychological processes were shaped by evolutionary 
forces and that (b) such psychological processes and behavioral patterns can be best 
understood in light of such evolutionary forces, are as solid and reasonable as the 
theory of evolution itself. Acknowledging this point is sure to benefit all work 
conducted in the realm of psychology. PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 15 (2006), 2, 181-202 
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